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Abstract 
 
The research system is highly dependent upon the resources provided by the political 
system. Rising costs of research projects and the emergence of financial problems in 
government have triggered a reduction in direct support to public research organisations (PRO). 
The aim of this paper is to analyse how a group of Spanish public research organisations 
affected by the reduction in direct transfers of State funds have reacted to this situation. By 
reviewing the PROs’ responses, an institutionalist argument is built up based on the degree and 
type of autonomy which the centres and researchers enjoy. Factors which explain the diversity 
in responses of the centres in their funding strategies are: a) the political autonomy of the PROs 
with respect to their tutelary Ministries, and b) the autonomy of the researchers within the 
organisation, the nature of the individual incentive programmes and their level of dependence 
on collective resources. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Governments have been developing research policies for over 50 years; the S&T policy 
domain has consolidated. Policies in favour of R&D have changed and evolved (Elzinga and 
Jamison, 1995; Sanz Menéndez and Borrás, 2001): The first interventions promoted research by 
creating public research centres; the sixties and the seventies saw the introduction of 
mechanisms and incentives by which universities and companies could further their research 
activities, first by means of the Research Councils (Rip, 1994) and later via strategic R&D 
programmes (Irvine and Martin, 1984); today, various forms of government intervention coexist 
with different emphasis across countries. 
Research is an activity which is extraordinarily dependent upon external resources from 
the political system (Solingen, 1993), particularly the public R&D centres are very dependent 
on governmental resources. Research activity is very sensitive to turbulent environments, 
changes in their situation, political crises, and even to economic recessions that affect the 
availability of public money. In fact, the reduction in the institutional funding1 that occurred in 
the nineties in many countries proved to be a problem for the furthering of research in public 
research organisations, threatening their very existence. 
This paper presents a study of the responses of the public research organisations (PROs)2 
to these changes in their environment. More specifically it describes the strategies that public 
research organisations adopted in order to cope with the reduction in direct public financing. 
Some organisations' responses were simply compliant, while others were very active. Given 
that responses were diverse, the second question is how to explain this when the financial 
problems being faced were quite general. Thus, the objective of this paper is the analysis of the 
public research performing organisations in Spain and especially their ability to deal with a 
changing financial environment. 
Our study covers the analysis of eight publicly owned research organisations in Spain 
(see Table 1), which are accountable to specific Ministries depending on their nature and are 
important, well established and relatively large organisations 3. These organisations, up until the 
mid-seventies, were the only sites for research in Spain. During the nineties, as a result of the 
economic recession, there was a reduction of the direct transfers of funds from the Central 
Government to these research centres. Six of the PROs are only research performing 
                                                 
1 We are going to use the concept “institutional funding” to refer to the traditional block grant funding to 
R&D centres as opposed to “external funding” coming from competitive sources, contract research, etc. 
2 Here we focus in organisations (differentiated), which could be comprised of several research centres 
and/or laboratories. 
3 See: Alonso, Fernández and Sanz-Menéndez (2001), López Facal and Represa (1998), Muñoz et al. 
(1999) or Sanz-Menéndez and Cruz (2001). 
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organisations, while others resemble Research Councils 4. They are also very diverse in mission, 
size, fields of specia lisation, internal organisation, scientific competences and institutional 
affiliation5. 
 
Table 1.- Selected Spanish Public Research Organisations  (PROs) 
Acronym English literal translation 
Year of 
creation 
Average 
Staff year 
2000 
Ministerial 
affiliation 
year 2000 
Most relevant Areas of 
Scientific and Technical 
expertise 
Similar organisations in 
France, Germany,  U. 
K., Italy 
CSIC Higher Council for Scientific Research 1939 9,508 
Education 
and Culture All kinds of basic and 
applied research CNRS, MPG, ---, CNR 
CIEMAT 
Centre for Energy, 
Environmental and 
Technological Research 
1948 1,142 
Industry and 
Energy  Energy, nuclear,  
environment 
CEA, KfK, UKAEA, 
ENEA 
IGME Spanish Institute for Geomining Technology  1859 421 
Environment 
Geology, mining BRGM, BfGR, BGS/NERC, SGI 
INTA 
“Esteban Terradas” 
National Institute for 
Aerospace Technology  
1942 1,400 
Defence Aeronautic, space, 
electronic, 
communications,  
CERT-ONERA, DLR, 
DERA, CIRA 
INIA 
National Institute for 
Agriculture and Food 
Research and Technology  
1971 984 
Agriculture, 
Fishing and 
Food 
Animal health, 
forestry, agriculture 
food, fito & zoo-
genetic resources 
INRA, FAL/IPK, 
BBSRC, ISC/ISZA 
IEO Spanish Institute for Oceanography 1942 460 
Agriculture, 
Fishing and 
Food 
Oceanography, 
fisheries, aquaculture, 
marine environment  
IFREMER, BfF, DFR, 
-- 
ISCIII “Carlos III” Health Institute 1986 1.054 
Health and 
Consumer 
Affairs 
Health and biomedical 
research 
INSERM, GSF, 
MRC/NIMR, ISTISAN 
CEDEX 
Centre for Public Works 
Studies and 
Experimentation 
1957 735 
Public 
Works 
Materials, public 
works hydrography 
environment 
LCPCh, BASt, TRLL, 
ISMES 
 
 
We begin our paper with a brief literature review; although there is no specific theory for 
explaining the “response to problems” (Schimank and Stucke, 1994 a), the organisation theory 
and institutional analysis offer us an analytical framework, built on the “dependence on 
resources” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the “adaptive” responses (March, 1994), in which to 
situate our study. The third section describes the changes in the Spanish research system, the 
specific environment within which these organisations function, and their responses to the 
changes in the levels of institutional funding. The fourth section, in view of the significant 
variation in the responses by the different organisations, builds up an explanation based on the 
                                                 
4 In two of the cases, ISCIII and INIA, the PROs also maintain management functions as “research 
councils” providing competitive research funds for extramural research which are included in their 
budgets. 
5 Since April 2000 some PROs (CSIC, CIEMAT, INIA, IGME and IEO) have changed their ministerial 
affiliation and today are under the new Ministry of Science and Technology. 
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degree of autonomy of research actors, both individual and organisational. Finally we construct 
a typology of strategies of response followed by PROs.  
 
 
2  How research organisations cope with problems 
 
Universities and firms, as research actors, have attracted the attention of scholars, while 
little attention have been paid to the systematic study of public research centres6. In sociology of 
science it has been traditional to study the relationship between the cognitive dimension of 
knowledge production and the research in "action" (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 
1981), however the focus was not on the organisations themselves. 
The changing role of PROs in the research systems has attracted the attention of policy 
makers (OECD, 1989) as well as scholars in connection with the emergence of new 
intermediary institutions (van der Meulen and Rip, 1994; Benner and Sandström, 2000). 
Government-owned R&D centres have been studied in the context of knowledge production 
units: the research laboratories; few contributions aimed to characterise and understand the 
dynamic of changes that were based on typologies of R&D laboratories, e.g. the "environmental 
context taxonomy" (Bozeman and Crow, 1990; Crow and Bozeman 1987 a, b; Crow and 
Bozeman, 1991), the "compass card of research" (Laredo et al., 1992; Laredo and Mustar, 
2000), or the "industrial partnership orientation" of public laboratories (Joly and Mangematin, 
1996). 
More recently, issues and trends such as privatisation or the shift to private management 
schemes of government-owned laboratories (Boden et al, 2001), reforms (Dufour and de la 
Mothe, 2001), increasing pressure for commercialisation and technology transfer (Bozeman, 
1994) or the relevance of the S&T policy in shaping the configurations of laboratories (Callon et 
al., 1992) have been addressed. Analyses have focused on the reactions to political disturbances 
of research conditions (Schimank and Stucke, 1994 a; Schimank and Stucke, 1994 b) 
alternatively, on reactions to budget constraints imposed by governments (Alonso, Fernández 
and Sanz-Menéndez, 2001; Sanz-Menéndez and Cruz, 2001). 
Public funding has been a necessary condition for the very existence of the R&D system. 
Governments delegate research in varying degrees to other organisations or actors which would 
otherwise lack the financial resources to carry out this research; however, in recent decades, this 
delegation has taken place in the context of far higher research costs together with a reduction in 
real terms of the public resources available for this research. Faced with a situation of a relative 
                                                 
6 Exceptions are: Cox et al. (Editors) (2001), Crow and Bozeman (1998) and research reported by Senker 
(2000). 
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lack of financial resources, organisational theory helps to understand PROs’ behaviours and 
their responses to the new external conditions. 
This paper is about how the external environment affects and constrains research 
organisations and how organisations respond to these external constraints. Given that the 
fortune of the public research organisations depends greatly on the political system, research 
organisations are characterised as open systems which support themselves through the exchange 
of resources with their environments (Aldrich, 1979; Meyer and Scott, 1992). Moreover the 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) points out that no organisation is self-
sufficient and the need to acquire resources in order to develop its activities creates dependence 
between the organisation and a number of external actors. The nature and extent of this 
dependence is determined by the volume of the resources required for what constitutes the core 
activity of the centre and by the relative abundance of these resources7. Resource dependence 
characterises the research system in several ways, researchers depend upon the knowledge 
produced by others in order to progress (De Solla Price, 1963) but they are also dependent on 
economic resources from the political system. 
Organisations may work actively to promote their opportunities, thus we could explain 
short term adaptation and organisational change as reactions to problems, especially when 
funding is central in terms of organisational survival and competitiveness. Organisations might 
be understood as coalitions of interests that face an environment of competing, frequently 
conflicting, demands and that need resources from those environments. The members of the 
organisations, and particularly but not exclusively their management boards, actively pursuit the 
establishment of ties with the external environment of the organisation, identifying problems, 
opportunities and threats, they seek favourable exchanges. Thus organisational strategies are 
developed to cope with external constraints; the concept of “organisational strategy” implies 
itself the ability of organisations to respond actively. 
We would also argue that the bases for this dependence (or its counterpart, autonomy) are 
of an institutional character which may only be understood by looking at the social bases and 
the regulations controlling stability and change within organisations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 1995). Given that PROs, as with all organisations, move simultaneously in a number of 
different environments, the resource dependence approach is useful to understand the responses 
to changes in the financial environment; however, it is also important to look at the institutional 
and social environments8.  
                                                 
7 Dependence is the antithesis of power and the power of one actor over another is inversely proportional 
to the capacity of that actor to obtain resources outside his relationship with the latter (Emerson, 1962). 
8 The social environment provides the values and expectations which the organisations must observe. 
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If the reduction in the public budget devoted to research is thought of as a problem 
derived from changes in the political and economic environment, there are different feasible 
adaptive responses which the research centres could apply. Analysis of the mechanisms by 
which researchers, managers and organisations cope with these problems is carried out from an 
institutional perspective, a perspective which, nevertheless, takes into consideration the 
organisational actors and the means by which they choose a particular pattern of behaviour from 
the different available strategies, according to their interests, resources, opportunity structures, 
etc. 
It may be expected that PROs, facing a common threat will undertake similar forms of 
action. Organisations that belong to the same organisational field tend to be isomorphic 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), particularly if the regulations within which they must function 
are the same. However, these regulations do not fully explain the institutional context in which 
the research centres and their investigators are moving. The individual and collective incentives 
in favour of certain behaviours, the managerial structures of organisations, and the conditions 
which generate the existence of markets and research users in certain areas are institutional 
elements which may lead to the divergence rather than convergence. 
It may be assumed that the principal objective of the actors involved in research is to 
assure the continuity of their activities: reproduction. Thus, to answer the problem presented by 
the reduction in available public funds, researchers and the research centres -represented by 
their managers- may adopt different patterns of behaviours. The resource dependence approach 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) gives us some possible organisational responses to the demands 
confronted: The possibility of compliance with external constraints, or simple adaptation, as 
well as the possibility of avoiding inf luence and thus managing and avoiding dependence. Of 
the possible expected responses of these publicly owned R&D organisations, there are a number 
of relatively passive ones, specifically those which accept the situation and do not take any 
form of action which could modify the effects of the change in the environment. Other reactions 
are more or less active, ranging from the prevention of the effects of changes, for which the 
players have to count on knowing the information before they occur, to active adaptation. 
Organisational theory also tells us about the relevance of individuals in organisations, and we 
could expect that the way in which active responses take place could have two forms: 
individual or collective. Faced with this politically-induced problem which we are taking as a 
reference, that of the reduction in direct financing, the organisations collectively, through their 
directors, or the researchers on an individual basis, may undertake actions aimed at searching 
for external sources of finance which guarantee the continuation of the activity. The analysis 
must therefore combine two different levels of action, that of the individual researcher and that 
of the research centre. 
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3 Research organisations in their S&T environment 
 
During Franco’s dictatorship “the majority of scientific research [in Spain] was carried 
out in the government centres or institutions (and) from the financial point of view, 85% of the 
total research expenditure for the country was channelled through seven R&D centres” (OECD, 
1964). The Spanish public research centres were institutions set up by the Ministries, that 
framed their missions, and which were funded from the National Budget. Their employees held 
civil servant status (though contracted researchers were also present) and their research 
activities were carried out in line with ministerial interests. Institutional funding was the rule 
and there were almost no external sources of finance. Moreover institutional restrictions 
imposed by Ministries also applied and some R&D centres were not allowed to accept external 
funding (either through contracts or grants) to increase their own budgets. The organisations 
were managed under a system of bureaucratic hierarchical authority and the allocation of 
resources to the different projects, units or researchers was based on the discretionary decisions  
made by the general directors who were appointed by their Ministers. 
During the eighties there were significant increases in public spending on research, as 
well as a change in the provision of economic resources, with increasing emphasis on 
competitive funding as a way of providing support for research9. Despite the large increases in 
public investment in R&D, government budget appropriations and outlays in R&D (GBAORD) 
moved from 700 Million ecus in 1980 to 2,360 Million in 1990 (both in prices 1990 PPP), there 
was a relative loss of weight of the government performing sector with respect to other research 
sectors. Budgetary expenditure on the public R&D organisations in 1980 represented 57.2% of 
the total whereas, in 1990, this had fallen to 32.6%. 
 
3.1 INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
 
On the period of reference –1980s- institutional and organisational reforms were also in 
place, affecting both the S&T environment and the research centres themselves, their 
management structures, goals, etc. The changes in the environment were the consequence of 
                                                 
9 The growth in public spending on R&D occurred not so much in terms of increases in institutional 
funding for the public R&D centres but rather as “competitive financial support”, either under “research 
council funding” or the “strategic R&D programmes” included in the National Plan for R&D. It was a 
strategy of simultaneously building a “research council system”, to provide competitive funding for 
research actors [through the “General Promotion of Knowledge Program” (PGC), the Health Research 
Fund (FIS), among others] and a “strategic R&D programming” with scientific priorities consolidated 
within the National R&D Plan. For a systematic analysis of the research policy changes in Spain see: 
Sanz-Menéndez (1997). 
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policies aimed at reorganising government intervention in favour of R&D and, later in the 
nineties, of the changes in public resources allocated for research. 
Furthermore, the government developed policy reforms in the area of science and 
technology which affected universities10 and research centres, the objectives and the instruments 
of public intervention (the establishment of a National Plan for R&D), and even the ways of 
organising and co-ordinating public activity (the creation of an Inter-Ministerial Commission on 
Science and Technology - CICYT). A cornerstone of these reforms was the Act on the 
Promotion and General Co-ordination of Scientific and Technological Research (Act 13/1986), 
better known as the Science Act. This law defined new objectives, rules and the creation of new 
institutions in the field of science and technology policy11. 
Implicit in the changes in the S&T policy was the decision to pressure the PROs to 
compete for the new public funding and to search for contract research. In the Science Act, the 
regulations affecting the public research centres were designed to homogenise situations and 
provide them with flexibility in order to improve their alignment with the priorities of the 
National Plan. The Act created the new legal status of "Public Research Organisations" 
(PROs)12 which were declared subject to a number of common organisational principles and 
actions; the most important affected: the economic management of the PROs, the flexibility to 
contract non-civil service researchers and the possibility to create new economic incentives for 
researchers. The PRO got: a) the status of “autonomous commercial organisations”, although 
they maintained their affiliation with their tutelary Ministry that provided the institutional 
funding; thus they were able to opt for “external funding, from competitive national or 
European funds and by the signing of agreements or contracts with companies, to finance their 
activities; b) the mechanisms by which to contract temporary researchers to carry out R&D 
projects; and c) the possibility that a proportion of the commercial income derived from 
contracts signed with firms, for scientific work or technical assessment, could be transferred to 
individual researchers in the form of productivity bonuses in their salaries.  
The new regulations increased the number of alternative strategies for managers and 
researchers within the R&D organisations under the new institutional framework managers and 
researchers were confronted with a larger set of options available to respond. They paved the 
way for the diversification of the sources of funding, they facilitated staff's increases even in 
                                                 
10 The Act on University Reform was passed in 1983. 
11 It was a pressure to align the research agendas in the universities and R&D centres with social and 
economic requirements by means of “prioritised research” (Sanz-Menéndez, et al., 1993), but also an 
allocation increase of competitive research funds through systematic scientific evaluation (Sanz-
Menéndez, 1995 b) and the promotion of incentives to increase “external funding”  (Sanz-Menéndez, 
1995 a). 
12 In Spanish: Organismos Públicos de Investigación (OPIS). 
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years of public austerity, and they created an institutionalised system of individual economic 
incentives in PROs in the same way that was established for university researchers. The pre-
conditions for an increase in the autonomy of the centres and an improvement in their 
management were then created. However, the implementation of this autonomy was something 
which the centres had to decide for themselves and obtain from their respective Ministries. 
Thus, when there was a reduction in the available institutional funding during the nineties, the 
PROs already held the instruments to respond or at least to adapt to such changes. 
 
3.2 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE 1990s 
 
While in the eighties there had been a growth in real terms of the funds provided to the 
R&D centres, in the nineties, the favourable climate for R&D changed with the onset of a period 
of relative stagnation and even a decline in the public contribution to R&D, as result of the 
political priority set by the Spanish Government about strict control of public expenditure to 
reduce public deficit figures13 (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Spanish Total Government R&D appropriations ("Function 54 of the Annual 
Budget") (Millions euros at constant prices of 1996)  
 
 
Source: Presupuestos Generales del Estado (Spanish Annual Budget), various years.  
                                                 
13 Additionally since 1997 the growth of the government R&D budget appropriations (GBAORD), have 
been produced in Chapter 8 of the National Budget, under the modalities of repayable loans, aimed 
particularly at businesses, and which have come to represent almost 50% of the total government budget. 
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In the same way as the changes in the overall R&D budgetary appropriations 
(GBOARD) worsened at the start of the nineties, so also did the institutional funding of the 
research centres, which levelled off and even fell, in real terms, showing a slow recovery since 
1997. 
 
Table 2. Direct Government Budget Appropriations for in house research of Public 
Research Organisations. Changes over previous year in real terms (constant prices of 1996) and 
index numbers (1990 = 100) 1990-2001 
 
 1.991 1.992 1.993 1.994 1.995 1.996 1.997 1.998 1.999 2.000
INTA 123,0 159,9 151,7 140,9 135,0 120,2 116,8 116,7 115,2 113,6
CEDEX 96,3 92,8 91,2 88,2 97,4 86,7 86,3 83,0 81,1 77,4
CSIC 88,5 86,2 84,1 79,5 82,2 73,2 76,4 78,7 84,7 90,5
INIA 101,0 100,3 93,3 83,0 82,7 73,6 73,4 75,4 78,1 103,6
IEO 108,9 96,8 98,0 80,4 90,7 80,8 85,7 96,3 110,8 119,5
ISCIII 87,3 79,7 70,4 69,1 76,7 68,3 71,6 80,9 84,0 90,8
CIEMAT 97,9 95,5 89,2 78,5 77,2 68,7 71,2 70,7 76,8 82,0
IGME 95,1 76,8 70,5 48,0 44,6 39,7 43,1 42,3 48,1 50,2
All PROs 95,8 96,1 91,7 84,1 86,1 76,6 83,5 85,5 90,7 97,4
 
Source: Presupuestos Generales del Estado (Spanish Annual Budget), various years.  
 
 
Only in recent years, some of the centres have recovered their 1990 levels of funding, in 
real terms, but in aggregate terms the institutional funding figures for PROs are still below their 
1990 levels (see Table 2), with the exception of INTA, INIA and IEO. In general, between 1991 
and 1997, the real annual rates of change in the institutional funding for PROs were negative, 
with accumulated reductions that vary from 20 to 60%.  
Additionally, their fortunes were shaped by their tutelary Ministry. The PROs 
dependent on the Ministry of Industry suffered greater relative cuts compared to those 
depending on Defence, Agriculture and Education. Ministerial dependence introduces variance 
because the process which determines the “budgetary cuts” is fixed in each Ministry. In those 
years, the “pro-business” ideology and that of the reduction in the direct involvement in 
research was supported by the Ministry of Industry which did not wish to have its own research 
centres but rather to promote private R&D. On the other side, the two PROs (INIA and IEO) 
that most rapidly recovered the institutional funding levels of 1990 were, at that time, under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. However, a further clarification is needed with respect to INTA. The 
INTA received an increase in its budget between 1990 and 1992, allowing it to initiate a 
programme of mini-satellites to give Spain the capacity to launch and produce them. In this 
case, its alignment with Ministry of Defence objectives became an advantage in terms of 
increasing budgets and net transfers. 
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3.3 EXTERNAL FUNDING AS A RESPONSE  
 
The organisational and institutional changes and, above all, the levelling off of 
budgetary credits transferred directly to the PROs became a strong pressure to change. To what 
extent did this new environment lead to a response of the research organisations concerning the 
funding of their activities?  
We have used the increase of external funding14 of the centres as an indicator both of 
the type of response to the changes and of the degree of adaptation of the centres to the new 
economic environment. What interests us, firstly, is to determine how the increase in external 
funding may be explained and to what extent these changes were just the result of, or reaction to 
the difficulties and to the reductions in direct funding. 
If we look at the external funding evolution, there was considerable variation in the 
PROs responses to the new environment, both in the type of strategy adopted and in the 
intensity of the reaction. Some PROs started to commercialise their knowledge or to diversify 
their sources of income, while others, in contrast, hardly looked for external funding despite the 
opportunities created by the new regulations. Thus, in 2000 some centres obtain almost one 
third of their total budget from sources other than institutional funding, while other maintain 
status quo. The CSIC is an extreme case as, in one decade, the proportion of non institutional 
funding in the total budget of expenses had doubled implying that for every two euros 
transferred to the CSIC by the State, its researchers were able to generate almost another one to 
support their research activities. At the other end of the spectrum are the PROs, such as the 
ISCIII, the IGME or the CEDEX, with very limited levels of external funding for performing 
R&D (see table 3), the data relating to the responses of the centres are presented and also the 
1996 institutional funding levels in comparison with the situation in 1990. 
 
 
                                                 
14 We will use the term “external funding” or “non-budgetary income” to refer to the PROs income not 
comming from institutional funding. The type and degree of intensity of the responses to problems of 
funding is analysed by means of a “proxy” which is the percentage of the final total expenditure budget 
which is funded by resources coming from “commercial operations”, not from direct transfer from the 
National Budget at the beginning of each year. 
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Table 3. Some indicators of the financial stress and responses of Spanish PROs s 
Acronym 
Institutional 
Funding for 
Research 
Performing 
Organisations 
PROs, 2000 
(Millions 
Euros) 
Institutional 
funding in real 
terms. 1996 
[comparison 
with the level of 
1990. Index 
numbers 
(1990= 100)]  
External 
funding as % of 
total research 
expenditures 
[average 1997-
2000] 
Main Sources of external Funding and 
relevance in 2000 
CSIC 261,8 73.2 31% 
National R&D Plan (33%) 
Framework R&D Programme (33%) 
Firm’s contracts (22%) 
CIEMAT 51.9 68.7 25% 
Firm’s contracts (33%) 
Framework R&D Programme (32%) 
 
IGME 22.4 39.7 8% Firm’s contracts (50%) Agreements with Public Sector (35%)  
INIA 33.1 (*) 73.6 18% 
Agriculture R&D Program (25) 
Agreements with Public Sector (20%) 
UE Funds (17%)  
National R&D Plan (15%) 
Firm’s contracts (8%) 
IEO 29.7 80.8 14% Fishing Secretariat (40%) Framework R&D Programme (30%) 
INTA 88.3 120.2 20% 
Firm’s contracts (50%) 
Agreements with Public Sector (30%) 
Other international Funds (20%) 
ISCIII 68.1 (**) 68.3 7 % 
Health research Fund (FIS) (40%) 
National R&D Plan (21%) 
Framework R&D Programme (15%) 
CEDEX 33.0 86.7 5 %  Agreements with Public Sector (35%) 
Framework R&D Programme (30%) 
(*) It excludes 9 million euros of they "research funding agency mission, offered through open invitation to bids for 
which the researchers of the INIA make compete.  
(**) Excludes the Health Research Fund (FIS) budget and funding to be transferred to other institutions which is of 
about 45 million euros; since 2000, the researchers of the ISCIII can no longer compete for this.  
 
 
The strategies for adaptation based on external fund raising have varied among the 
centres that suffered the greatest reduction in transfers during the nineties, such as the CEDEX, 
the IGME, the ISCIII, and the CIEMAT. The ISCIII, the CEDEX and the IGME chose 
strategies that involved services to the Public Authorities, while the CIEMAT developed a 
strategy based on obtaining external funds and, fundamentally, through sales to the private-
sector, cases where its R&D capabilities were almost a monopoly. In contrast, of the 
organisations receiving the most favourable treatment, at least during the worst years, the INTA 
is seen to be active in the search for external funding. Other PROs that have medium stress in 
terms of financial pressures, as it was the case with the CSIC, the IEO and the INIA have 
reacted with different intensity by means of getting external funding.  
If the organisational and institutional conditions of all the centres were identical, a 
greater reduction in the budgetary allocation from the National Budget would be expected to 
 13
lead to a greater incentive for the organisations to search more closely for non-institutional 
funding sources. However, this correlation is neither linear nor direct; the percentage of external 
funding is variable among the PROs.  
The degree of stagnation or reduction in the institutional funding, in constant terms, 
does not explain by itself the actions in place, nor it accounts for why some PROs have 
implemented and succeeded in obtaining external funding to an extraordinary degree in order to 
continue and even expand their R&D activities whilst others have not.  
 
 
4 Differentiated adaptive reactions: “Autonomy” as 
an explanatory factor 
 
The Spanish PROs had similar financial pressures, however, the proportion of external 
funding they obtained varies; some centres faced the problem using a strategy of  active 
adaptation, others have passively accepted the new situation. In this section, we explore the 
factors that explain these variations. 
We know that institutional trajectories explain much of the responses, but in this section 
we will explore other factors. We would argue that obtaining of external funding is the outcome 
of a complex process of interactions between the autonomy of the researchers with respect to 
their PRO, and the autonomy of the organisation with respect to the political system. The bases 
for the two types of autonomy are of institutional and organisational character.  
The autonomy of an organisation with respect to the political system, which depends on 
the strength of the relationship with the tutelary Ministry, is what determines the room for 
manoeuvre for the management of the PROs. Autonomy in this sense means to move away from 
traditional missions, to become a general knowledge producer or a specialised supplier of 
knowledge for industry. The nature of the research work being carried out or the services 
offered by the PRO affect this type of autonomy, making it possible to establish contacts with 
the external research users and contractors, in different degrees according to the area of R&D, 
independently from the missions assigned by the Ministry. 
A second factor, the autonomy of the researchers with respect to their organisations, is 
shaped by the way in which the research activity is organised, mainly by “semi-independent 
research groups” or through the “departments, units or institutes”. The impact of this factor is 
also mediated by the possibility for developing individual research strategies, based also on 
limited dependence on collective resources (infrastructures, equipment and human resources) 
which the organisation manages and, additionally, by the existence of automatic 
institutionalised individual economic incentives systems (not depending from the directors but 
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rather their obtention of funds) which weaken the traditional lines of authority in the 
organisation. The two types of autonomy are not necessarily linked. 
 
4.1 POLITICAL AUTONOMY vis a vis THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
The Ministerial authorities maintain a relationship with the PROs which is shaped by 
the general regulations, the appointment of the directors and the allocation of annual 
institutional funding. On the other side, the PROs have a regulatory framework which allows 
them to obtain external funding which they can add to their budget in order to carry out research 
projects and activities. 
The Ministries have a historical record of relationships with the PROs and some 
ministries have been “requiring” from them knowledge production, technical assessment or 
services which are necessary for carrying out their normal activities. If the tutelary Ministry 
promotes this type of relationship, it is difficult for the centre's director to refuse; what he/she 
can do is to request the necessary resources to carry out these missions so that the Ministry 
transfers greater resources by means of purchasing services, the signing of agreements or the 
commissioning of projects. Thus, Ministerial authorities must approve, permit and even 
promote the degree of autonomy of their affiliated centre to encourage the search for new funds 
that generally implies less dependence. The basis for this movement by the Ministerial decision-
makers may be variable: the abandoning of the old idea of the centre's subordination exclusively 
to the needs of the Ministry, the acceptance of the new ideas for the co-ordination of the policies 
on science and technology, or simply the search for solutions to the limitations imposed by the 
budgetary restrictions; it could also be the result of the consolidation of a private sector able to 
provide the Ministry with the same services. 
Then the PROs' escaping from the traditional mission of simple knowledge supplie r to 
the Ministry is a precondition for the search of external funding. Without political autonomy of 
the PRO, neither managers nor researchers would have the conditions to be active in the search 
for external funds; if the mission is fully determined by the Ministry, managers and researchers 
tend to expect it should be supported by it. 
Thus, our argument predicts that the lesser the degree of autonomy of the centres with 
respect to the political system, the fewer incentives there will be for the management of these 
centres to adapt to the new environmental pressures and to search for alternative funding. The 
PROs whose mission, due to their institutional history, is centred on the provision of technical 
assessment or services to their respective tutelary Ministry, will tend to pay less attention to the 
search of external funding, even in a crisis context. The management in these organisations does 
not see advantages in competing for resources, as these centres are not assessed by the increase 
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in their research quality or activity but rather by the degree to which they accomplish a 
delegated mission.  
In contrast to this situation, those PROs with a general mission or technology transfer 
roles to some industries could find it advantageous and more feasible to increase their income 
from external sources. In these cases, the centres concentrate the greater part of their activities 
in research and may be characterised as knowledge producers. The opportunities for external 
funding are different and vary in each centre due to the existence of extensive R&D or focused 
programmes, contracts (military or industrial) or a technology demanding industrial sector. 
The specific functional activity of the PRO creates certain situations which may affect 
their opportunities for adapting their funding strategies. In this case, our hypothesis predicts that 
the search for external funding would be more intense in those PRO which, due to their area of 
technology or research, are involved in specialised international R&D programmes or markets 
in which “to sell” their services and capabilities is a possibility. Finally, the differences in the 
nature of the research mission imply differences in terms of costs and financial requirements.  
Thus, organisational autonomy, the first type of autonomy which we have analysed, is 
defined mainly by political dependence and by the outside opportunities available for financing 
the PROs' specific area of activity. 
 
 4.2 AUTONOMY OF RESEARCHERS: RESEARCH ACTIVITY, INCENTIVES 
AND RESOURCES 
 
The second element in the explanation of the diversity of responses and funding 
strategies, the autonomy of researchers within the PROs, refers to the structure of individual 
incentives and capabilities for the search for external funding. Faced with the problems caused 
by the reduction in available internal funding, the greater or lesser degree to which 
diversification of sources is involved in the response depends firstly, on the way the research 
activity is organised, secondly, on the fact that professional career and salary prospects are 
associated with certain types of behaviours, and thirdly, on the extent to which the researchers 
accept the authority of the directors because they need the collective research resources 
managed by the PROs. In their search for external funding the research organisations face a 
problem of collective action. Organisations are coalitions of interest and managers need to 
mobilise those diverse interests towards organisational objectives. Authority of the managers is 
one of the possibilities, but institutionalised incentives, either moral or economic, could also be 
the necessary mechanism to solve the collective action problem; then once the precondition (the 
political autonomy of the PROs) is given, the search for external funding could be developed 
either from the authority of the PRO management or from the individual research groups.  
Since Merton, it is agreed that the scientific ethos may encourage the researcher to do 
the best he/she is capable. Nevertheless, analyses of the systems of individual incentives and the 
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remuneration systems help to understand better the commitment of the scientists to the search 
for external funding. A researcher’s income and his career are essential determinants of his 
results in research (Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990). If PROs need to increase their external funding, 
economic incentives would encourage their researchers, complementing their commitment to 
research; in that way individual interests become aligned with those of the organisation as a 
whole. 
Certain economic or professional advantages must exist under the new financial 
conditions in order for researchers to compete for external resources on an individual basis. If 
competing for resources and search for external funding only means an increase organisational 
funds, the researchers will have little incentive to make any great effort in this direction unless 
the dependence on common resources is significant. In this context, the commitment which 
resolves the problem of collective action is strengthened by the research ethos, by setting up 
specific, individual economic incentives and by limiting the dependence of the individual 
researcher on the organisation's resources. 
Organisations with greatest interest in obtaining external funding will offer economic 
incentives and professional advantages to their researchers. If the incentives encourage the 
researchers to compete for national, regional or European funds and for contracts with firms, the 
result will be an increase in the level of external funding for those PROs. This represents a type 
of active adaptation consequent to the aggregation of individual behaviours. 
However, it may also occur that, due to its particular nature, the research activity of a 
specific centre requires a volume and type of resources and equipment which exceed the fund 
raising capacity of any individual researcher. In these cases, and only when that the organisation 
has a degree of political autonomy of the first type and access to non-ministerial contractor 
markets, we may find an increase in the external funding due, fundamentally, to managerial 
action. In these circumstances, the management of the centre interested in obtaining external 
funding may make a strategic use of the dependence of the individual researchers in order to 
align their interests with those of the organisation.  
 
 
5  Funding strategies and diversity of responses 
 
Following these dimensions we could elaborate a typology of PRO responses to the 
environmental changes: 
?? Both a lack of organisational and individual autonomy, mean a situation of great 
dependence on the political system, and lead to a model of “passive compliance response” 
based on the more or less uncontested acceptance of the environmental changes and the 
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expectation that the tutelary Ministry or the Public Authorities will provide the solution to 
the problems which the centre is experiencing.  
?? An increase in autonomy with respect to their ministries, based on a strategy of escaping 
from dependence, will be an active response. Furthermore the way in which research 
activity is organised and the power of the management are two internal organisational 
factors that condition the response.  
o Systems where researchers have limited autonomy within the organisation, could 
produce a response that is the result of managerial strategies and actions; 
management control of collective resources in the organisation strengthens its 
position of authority. The response is active but, in this case organisational, as the 
search for external funding becomes a managerial function. 
o Systems organised on the basis of “independent research groups” or with developed 
systems of individual incentives, which promote the autonomy of the researchers 
with respect to the organisation, or where investigators do not depend on the 
organisation's resources in order to carry out their research, could lead to a response 
to changes in the environment which would be also active, but based on individual 
researchers' strategies. 
In fact having much more external income is, sometimes, the product of the sum of 
multiple initiatives by individual researchers whilst, on other occasions, it is the result of the 
institutional action of the centre's management or of the requests from the Ministries which 
exploit the abilities of their research centres. 
Having now described the principal factors which explain the diversity in responses of 
the centres in their funding strategies we shall apply this typology to our cases. As it mentioned, 
the combination of the two dimensions gives us three different empirical types of strategies. The 
specific features of the PROs associated to the two dimensions of the autonomy allow as to 
situate them in the typology and to define the type of reactions that the PROs have developed in 
the last years as response to the crisis on the institutional funding.  
 18
 
Table 4. – Typology of the adaptive response strategies of PROs to the environmental 
changes. Percentage of external funding in brackets 
 
 
 
 
HIGH  
 
 
No Cases 
 
 
Active responses (individual) 
 
CSIC (31%) 
INIA (18%) 
IEO (14%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEVEL OF 
AUTONOMY 
OF THE  
RESEARCHERS  
 
 
LOW 
 
IGME (8%) 
ISCIII (7%) 
CEDEX (6%) 
 
Compliance: 
Passive or conformist adaptation 
 
CIEMAT (25%) 
INTA (20%) 
 
 
Active responses (collective or 
managerial lead 
                 LOW                       HIGH  
                       DEGREE OF POLITICAL AUTONOMY OF PROs  
 
 
 
Table 4 summarises the adaptive strategies and the level of external funding in the 
selected cases together with the relationship with the two forms of autonomy. The combination 
of these two dimensions of autonomy provides us with predictive elements on the state of the 
dependent variable. From this starting point, the levels of external funding may fall as the 
political autonomy of the centre with respect to their Ministries rises, when institutional funding 
guarantees were lost, up to the time when alternative “markets” for funding are found. A centre 
undergoing change may need some time for developing the “new practices” required to attract 
the external resources, i.e. consolidate a centre based on researchers who compete for research 
funds. The transition may occur more rapidly if external markets already exist which require 
research and knowledge in these areas. 
Which centres have reacted and which have adapted to the environmental changes in  
the nineties and why? The centres which have shown greatest reaction in their funding strategies 
and, in consequence, showed the highest levels of external funding are: CSIC, CIEMAT, INTA 
and INIA. While those which showed more compliance were ISCIII, CEDEX and IGME. The 
following discussion details our arguments: 
 
a) Active Reaction 1: Strategy of escaping from “dependence” based on “independent 
research groups” 
The CSIC is the organisation which obtains a greater proportion of external funds.  The 
CSIC represents the active type of strategy; and this is consistent with our argument as the CSIC 
is a centre which produces knowledge and which is involved in basic and applied research. It 
has markets, users and funders for their research activities. The CSIC also has an 
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institutionalised incentive system based on individual economic bonuses which have had a 
positive effect on the level of external funding during the nineties15.  
With respect to career prospects, the CSIC is the only organisation with similar career 
prospects to that of the universities. Another non-material incentive for the CSIC researchers 
which encourages them to compete for external funding is their autonomy in project decision-
making. The researchers who have external funds for their research projects and activities are 
free to decide in what they work. Furthermore, the acquisition of external funds creates a 
reputation for the researcher which works as an additional non-material incentive to compete for 
resources. 
Thus, the CSIC is a case of an active adaptive response, made possible by its political 
autonomy and which is basically the result of the aggregation of the individual behaviours of the 
researchers who respond to the incentives and who do not depend to an excessive degree on the 
common organisational resources in order to carry out their activities. 
The INIA and the IEO due to their structural features show a similar type of strategy 
though with considerably more modest results in terms of our dependent variable. Researchers 
do not depend too much on the common resources, but the absence of automatic individualised 
systems of salary incentives means that the response is smaller. In the INIA, the established 
system for the application of economic bonuses (productivity) -within the limits of traditional 
civil service- was also based on the assessment of the researcher’s results; this could explain the 
higher external funding of INIA, in addition to the fact that IEO has lower financial stress and 
IEO researchers have more dependence on the organisational resources. 
 
b) Active Reaction 2: Strategy of escaping from “dependence” based on “managerial 
authority" 
A second type of strategy is illustrated by a group of centres which receives significant 
external funding and includes the CIEMAT and the INTA. These centres demonstrate a type of 
active adaptive strategy though this is led by management. They may also be considered as 
knowledge producers, but their specific mission is to carry out R&D in their respective areas: 
                                                 
15 Although the Science Act, in article 18.2, makes a general allowance for the generation of credit to 
compensate the productivity of civil servant researchers, the CSIC is the only one of the PROs which has 
developed this possibility to enable each investigator to receive a fixed percentage (30%) of the research 
carried out with the external funding from contracts or research projects financed within the EU R&D 
Framework Programme. It is also the only organisation which, like the universities, has “extraordinary 
productivity bonuses”(sexenios) which are added to the researchers salary when he or she successfully 
passes an evaluation of his/her research activities; this is offered for every six years of results and is 
cumulative over time. 
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energy and aeronautics and space. Their activities are centred on basic research and 
technological development. 
The areas of research in which they are involved require high levels of investment and 
funding. This makes it difficult for individual researchers to initiate adaptive responses since 
they depend on the common organisational resources which are “controlled” by the 
management. This means that it is the management of these PROs whom is interested in 
obtaining external funds for research activities. However, none of these organisations have 
schemes for automatic non discretionary individual economic bonuses, as was the case in the 
CSIC; additionally the career perspectives for the researchers depend exclusively on their 
upward mobility to a position which is more beneficia l in terms of retributions.  
These centres illustrate a type of collective active adaptation not based on individual 
incentives, facilitated by a degree of freedom with respect to their Ministries which apply only 
moderate political pressure on the centres, allowing them to “sell” their research results in 
broader markets. The nature of the areas of research may also help to explain the level of 
external funding. Both centres are involved in highly internationalised areas of R&D, they 
occupy positions of monopoly with respect to the provision of knowledge in Spain, and require 
investment in technologically-advanced infrastructures. They also have powerful mechanisms to 
obtain external funds by involving themselves in European or international R&D programmes 
and through agreements with companies which may wish to invest. 
 
c) Passive response: Compliance with the environmental changes 
The third block is made up of those centres which have followed a more passive 
strategy in response to changes in the environment. Overall three cases (CEDEX, ISCIII and 
IGME) have not escaped from their ministerial political dependence and show lower levels of 
external funding. They are essentially service providers for their Ministries; for CEDEX, 
research is only a small part of its global activity. Thus, despite new opportunities to obtain 
funding, the management of these organisations has no clear incentive to do so. None of them 
have access to alternative "external markets" in which to sell their services. Furthermore, in 
these centres, there are no systems for compensation or professional advancement beyond the 
traditional schemes of the civil service. These are cases of passive adaptation to the changes in 
the economic environment caused by the absence, in practice, of the two types of autonomy 
which we have analysed. 
In fact, the functional, institutional and legal arrangements affecting the Carlos III 
Health Institute and even its mission, are derived from the General Act on Health (14/86) and 
not from the Science Act. Also in the area of health, there is a great degree of slack in the 
organisations with respect to research resources, meaning that the pressure to obtain resources 
for research is perhaps lower. The centre is also a health service provider for its Ministry. We 
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could say that the three compliance centres have not escaped from the ministerial political 
dependence. 
 
 
6 Final remarks 
 
The aim of this work has been to explore the process of organisational adaptation of the 
PROs to the changes in their environment, using an analytical framework which combines the 
organisation theory with some elements of an institutionalist perspective. The actors in the 
public research organisations, both managers and researchers, have adapted to an economic 
environment of reductions in direct funding during the nineties and to changes in the political 
and legal environment which encouraged them to align their research with social and economic 
objectives, and which made the search for external funding more feasible. We have found a 
significant variation in the responses to this new economic environment, both in the type of 
strategy and in the intensity of the reaction, despite the changes in regulations had contributed to 
the building up of an “organisational field” from which a certain degree of isomorphism could 
have been expected. In contrast, the adaptation by the management and the researchers in the 
different centres was carried out selecting a particular type of behaviour from the different 
possible lines of action. 
After investigating the diversity of these responses, measured as the percentage of 
external funding, we have hypothesised that the fundamental explanatory factor has been the 
degree of autonomy, made up on the one hand by the political independence of the organisations 
and, on the other, by the independence of the researchers within their centres. Both dimensions 
of autonomy have fundamentally institutional and normative bases; political autonomy comes 
from the historical relationship of exchange between the public research centre and its 
Ministries, it is a function of its mission, due to the room for manoeuvre implied by the 
hierarchical authority, and it is derived from possibilities of establishing commercial links with 
other actors in the system; individual independence is determined by relative presence in the 
organisations of individual incentive systems and of regulations on the use of common 
organisational resources which make the researchers more or less dependent. 
The combination of different degrees of these two dimensions has provided us with a 
typology of adaptive responses in which we have located our cases, confirming that the 
relationship between our variables is not linear. The ability to develop strategies based on 
competitive fund raising, both public and private, requires a change of context and the relative 
abandoning of the functions of service provider to Ministries in exchange of regular institutional 
funding. From this point of view, this past pattern must be considered as a step in an ongoing 
process. Nevertheless, lack of political autonomy could be thought of as a stable pattern in 
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which all necessary organisational activities are supported by direct transfers. This scenario, 
however, appears to have disappeared definitively. 
Further research is needed to study the direct impact on public R&D centres of new 
research actors and, finally, the changes in the public research organisations must be compared 
with the changes and transformations taking place in the universities as part of the research 
system. 
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